<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>ICS/OT/SCADA on Cutaway Security</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/categories/ics/ot/scada/</link><description>Recent content in ICS/OT/SCADA on Cutaway Security</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/categories/ics/ot/scada/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AI Gives Attackers OT Expertise on Demand. Here's What the Technique Looks Like on a Real PLC. (Part 1)</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gives-attackers-ot-expertise-on-demand-part-1/</link><pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gives-attackers-ot-expertise-on-demand-part-1/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;em>Earlier this week I said AI was closing the knowledge gap for attackers faster than the industry was ready for. This is the technique, demonstrated.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
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&lt;p>&lt;strong>TL;DR for OT leadership:&lt;/strong> Threat actors no longer need years of industrial experience to plan targeted attacks on your operational process. They need your configuration files (logic exports, address maps, HMI project files, manufacturer reference documents) and access to a production AI tool. With those, the AI tool supplies the process expertise the attacker does not have. It reads the logic, infers the physics, maps cross-system dependencies, and produces ranked attack paths with protocol-level instructions for executing them. The industrial-process knowledge gap that used to be a natural barrier against precision attacks has collapsed. For leadership, that changes three priorities. First, configuration files are process intelligence and must be protected like safety documentation. That means backup validation, integrity checks, and inventories of every copy wherever it lives, including copies held by vendors and contractors, and copies on the IT network. Second, remote access to engineering workstations deserves the same scrutiny you apply to your highest-value production systems, because that is where the intelligence lives. Third, the investment required for an adversary to weaponize this technique is trivial. A single analyst workday and a few dollars of API cost. Assume it is in use today, and fund your teams accordingly.&lt;/p></description><media:content xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gives-attackers-ot-expertise-on-demand-part-1/feature.png"/></item><item><title>AI Gives Attackers OT Expertise on Demand. Here's What the Technique Looks Like on a Real PLC. (Part 2)</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gives-attackers-ot-expertise-on-demand-part-2/</link><pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gives-attackers-ot-expertise-on-demand-part-2/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;em>Part 2. The first post showed what the technique produces. This post covers what it costs to produce, and what those numbers should change about how you fund your OT cybersecurity program.&lt;/em>&lt;/p></description><media:content xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gives-attackers-ot-expertise-on-demand-part-2/feature.png"/></item><item><title>AI Gave Attackers Something We Weren't Ready For. Here's What OT Defenders Need To Do About It.</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gave-attackers-something-we-werent-ready-for/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gave-attackers-something-we-werent-ready-for/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;em>It&amp;rsquo;s not that attackers got smarter. It&amp;rsquo;s that the tools available to them are closing the knowledge gap at a pace nobody anticipated. That changes things.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>

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&lt;p>&lt;strong>TL;DR:&lt;/strong> AI is accelerating ICS/OT threats in three big ways. Deployed OT solutions will always have some type of vulnerability, it is the nature of this industry. Tools like Mythos can chain vulnerabilities while also manipulating physical process data and the automation pipelines built on top of it. And attackers who previously lacked the domain knowledge to cause precision damage can now get it on demand. Not just shut systems off, but surgically target operational systems. The answer isn&amp;rsquo;t a new cybersecurity framework. It&amp;rsquo;s leadership getting behind the strategic and tactical basics, empowering their teams, and making sure those teams have the skills to execute.&lt;/p></description><media:content xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ai-gave-attackers-something-we-werent-ready-for/feature.png"/></item><item><title>Proxmox AI Development Lab</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/proxmox-ai-development-lab/</link><pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/proxmox-ai-development-lab/</guid><description>&lt;h2 class="relative group">TL;DR
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&lt;p>Setting up a proper Windows testing environment for ICS/OT security tool development goes beyond spinning up a single VM. You need multiple Windows versions, from legacy Windows 7 through Server 2022, templated, sysprepped, and network-isolated so you can rapidly deploy clean test systems and tear them down when you&amp;rsquo;re done. This post summarizes my experience building a Proxmox-based development lab with automated VM management for testing &lt;a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Sysmon&lt;/a> configurations and security scripts across every supported Windows version. The complete setup guide is available as a &lt;a href="https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/img/wp/2026/04/proxmox-dev-lab-guide.pdf" >PDF download&lt;/a>. We document these projects to both remember what we have done and also help others with similar projects.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Starting Cybersecurity Program for Small ICS / OT Teams</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/starting-cybersecurity-program-for-small-ics-ot-teams/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/starting-cybersecurity-program-for-small-ics-ot-teams/</guid><description>&lt;p>This morning I was thinking about completing an article I was writing about KPIs and OKRs. The more I wrote, the more I realized I was just regurgitating research and making pity comments. Which means, it was crap. So, I refocused and turned to AI to help me. I ask Google&amp;rsquo;s Gemini the following question.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Remote Access To Your BESS and You</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/remote-access-to-your-bess-and-you/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/remote-access-to-your-bess-and-you/</guid><description>&lt;p>This last week was the week of Battery Energy Storage System (BESS). &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/joew1/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Joe Weiss&lt;/a> released a blog post titled &lt;a href="https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55268074/cyber-vulnerable-battery-systems-are-catching-fire-and-communicate-directly-to-china" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Cyber-vulnerable battery systems are catching fire and communicate directly to China&lt;/a> where he discusses his concerns about threat actors from the People Republic of China (PRC) remotely accessing BESS deployments in the United States. While I share the concern I am not a fan of &amp;ldquo;reading between the lines&amp;rdquo; to correlate an event with threat actor activities.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Unrestricted Access to Your Critical Infrastructure - The U.S. Treasury</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/unrestricted-access-to-your-critical-infrastructure-the-u-s-treasury/</link><pubDate>Sat, 08 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/unrestricted-access-to-your-critical-infrastructure-the-u-s-treasury/</guid><description>&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://home.treasury.gov/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">US Treasury Department&lt;/a> is an industrial control environment integrated with an active business environment. This organization collects taxes, pays bills for the United States, produces coins and currency (ICS controllers, field devices, servers, and applications), manages government accounts, and enforces tax and finance laws. The recent access to access that has been provided to the &lt;a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/establishing-and-implementing-the-presidents-department-of-government-efficiency/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)&lt;/a> team equates unmoderated administrative access to this control environment. The US Treasure Department one piece of the United States&amp;rsquo; critical infrastructure.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Accelerating IACS / OT Cybersecurity Improvements</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/accelerating-iacs-ot-cybersecurity-improvements/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/accelerating-iacs-ot-cybersecurity-improvements/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today I had to remind myself to tell a team leader about an IT cybersecurity team member that provides superior security assessment work for a utility client. The IACS and OT industry likes to say that IT administrators and cybersecurity professionals cannot provide good guidance or do active assessments safely in production environments. This individual&amp;rsquo;s contributions to the vulnerability assessment of complex production and test environments continues to be invaluable and has helped to improve the design and deployment of solutions affecting millions of people supported by the utility.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Finger Wagging and Disrespecting Professionals Will Not Secure Critical Infrastructure</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/finger-wagging-and-disrespecting-professionals-will-not-secure-critical-infrastructure/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/finger-wagging-and-disrespecting-professionals-will-not-secure-critical-infrastructure/</guid><description>&lt;p>In his recent article, titled &lt;a href="https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55260023/critical-infrastructures-cannot-be-secured-because-network-security-and-engineering-wont-work-together" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Critical infrastructures cannot be secured because network security and engineering won’t work together&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/joew1/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Joe Weiss&lt;/a> has provided the IACS cybersecurity industry with an example of hyperbole and fear mongering what needs to be stamped out rather than perpetuated. The advancement and maturity of this field will not evolve effectively when build on, or supported by, this biased and bigoted vernacular. It is difficult to call out all the issues in his meandering post. So, I will focus on three important topics where he needs to take a hard look at his beliefs and the approach he is bringing to the security and safety of industrial and automation control environments.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Architecting Safety Using Cybersecurity Requirements and Assessments</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/architecting-safety-using-cybersecurity-requirements-and-assessments/</link><pubDate>Sat, 18 May 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/architecting-safety-using-cybersecurity-requirements-and-assessments/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://nexusconnect.io/articles/architecting-safety-using-cybersecurity-requirements-and-assessments" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Originally posted&lt;/a> at Claroty NexusConnect on May 9, 2024&lt;/p>

&lt;h3 class="relative group">The Cybersecurity Safety Challenge
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&lt;p>I started thinking about the safety issues for security assessments when I was asked to attend a conference for amusement rides and parks. Safety has always been paramount in this industry and their teams are working hard to understand and improve how cybersecurity fits into the phases of a ride&amp;rsquo;s lifecycle.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Bashing Education and Certifications Reduces Safety of Industrial and Automation Control Environments</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/bashing-education-and-certifications-reduces-safety-of-industrial-and-automation-control-environments/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/bashing-education-and-certifications-reduces-safety-of-industrial-and-automation-control-environments/</guid><description>&lt;p>Recently, I have noticed people emphasizing the name of certifications and personally attacking the people who obtain them. This is unfortunate as it is shining light on the wrong subject. The value of a certification is not in the name. The value of the certification is that it is an indication that an individual has received a level of instruction and demonstrated the ability to retain, reference, and recall that information. It is this foundation of knowledge that the individual can be held accountable for using during decision making.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Achieving the ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Expert Certification</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/achieving-the-isa-iec-62443-cybersecurity-expert-certification/</link><pubDate>Tue, 11 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/achieving-the-isa-iec-62443-cybersecurity-expert-certification/</guid><description>&lt;p>In February 2023 I was attending a conference for safety. I was introduced to many new people with roles that involved safe implementation of processes, equipment, and manual procedures that support the entertainment and safety of people all around the world. During one of my conversations, I was told that people purchasing services from large industrial control and automation vendors are not asking for people that have achieved the&lt;a href="https://www.giac.org/certifications/global-industrial-cyber-security-professional-gicsp/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"> GIAC GICSP certification&lt;/a>. They are specifically asking for people that have achieved the &lt;a href="https://www.isa.org/certification/certificate-programs/isa-iec-62443-cybersecurity-certificate-program" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity certifications&lt;/a>. That was the moment I decided I was going to achieve the ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Expert certification before the end of 2023.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Radio Expert Staged the Flipper Zero Meter Attack?</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/radio-expert-staged-the-flipper-zero-meter-attack/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/radio-expert-staged-the-flipper-zero-meter-attack/</guid><description>&lt;p>Initially, I ignored the YouTube video, &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3_0XHlCEQg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Flipper Zero attacking Smart Power Meters&lt;/a>. I watched it. I thought it was “interesting.” But, I did not want to spend a lot of time on it. After all, it has been over ten years since my Black Hat / DEFCON 20 talk, &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7dOTncK8fk" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Looking into the Eye of the Meter&lt;/a>. I do not have the time, resources, or permission to do any more work on smart meters. So, I figured I would leave it to others to address the findings in this video and the person involved.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>ICS/OT Cybersecurity Self Analysis - Physical Security</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ics-ot-cybersecurity-self-analysis-physical-security/</link><pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/ics-ot-cybersecurity-self-analysis-physical-security/</guid><description>&lt;p>Originally posted on the &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cutaway-security-llc_otcybersecurity-itcybersecurity-industrialcybersecurity-activity-7044346936824340480-zIu6" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Cutaway Security Linked In&lt;/a> on March 22, 2023.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Let&amp;rsquo;s consider some practical steps for a ICS/OT Cybersecurity Self Analysis. Today, let&amp;rsquo;s cover physical security at your substation, pumping station, or compressor station. We feel this checklist is a good start. Do you have items to add? &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cutaway-security-llc_otcybersecurity-itcybersecurity-industrialcybersecurity-activity-7044346936824340480-zIu6" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Let us know in the comments on Linked In&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Managing Cyber Risk in Industrial, Automated Environments</title><link>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/managing-cyber-risk-in-industrial-automated-environments/</link><pubDate>Sun, 12 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.cutawaysecurity.com/blog/managing-cyber-risk-in-industrial-automated-environments/</guid><description>&lt;p>Originally posted on the &lt;a href="https://nexusconnect.io/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Claroty Nexus Community&lt;/a> as &amp;ldquo;&lt;a href="https://nexusconnect.io/articles/managing-cyber-risk-in-industrial-automated-environments" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Managing Cyber Risk in Industrial, Automated Environments&lt;/a>&amp;rdquo;  on February 23, 2023.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Environments with industrial or automation control systems are built to ensure process availability and resilience. Availability is defined as &amp;ldquo;the quality of being able to be used or obtained&amp;rdquo; and resilience as &amp;ldquo;the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.&amp;rdquo; These days, these definitions do not necessarily take into consideration the rampant connectivity happening today within automation environments.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>